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I. INTRODUCTION

P
W

recision attacks dominate contemporary aerial warfare. The centrality of
precision operations derives not only from their military utility, but also
from the international community’s evolving expectations with respect to
the avoidance of collateral damage. As technological developments in the
field proceed apace, the emphasis on precision can only be expected to
grow.
This article examines the synergistic relationship between precision airstrikes and the law of armed conflict. It defines precision, briefly reviews
the history of its rise to prominence in aerial warfare, examines the application of the law of armed conflict to precision attacks and considers several
new precision weapon systems. In sum, the article explores both how the
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law of armed conflict governs the use of precision capabilities and how advances in precision capabilities are likely to shape the law of armed conflict.
II. THE DEFINITION OF “PRECISION” AND A BRIEF HISTORY
A. “Precision” Defined
“Precision” refers to the “ability to locate and identify a target, strike it accurately in a timely fashion, and determine whether desired effects have
been achieved or restrike is needed.”1 In discussing precision, many scholars address only accuracy. “Accuracy” refers to a weapon’s capacity to
strike a specific aimpoint2 and is an integral aspect of any precision airstrike.
But accuracy alone is insufficient to render a strike “precise.” Precision
is just as dependent on command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (known as C4ISR) capabilities. In fact, on a complex battlefield, ISR,3 not accuracy, often proves the
key aspect of a precision airstrike. For example, during Operation Enduring Freedom U.S. aircraft twice mistakenly attacked International Committee of the Red Cross warehouses.4 Weapons accuracy played no role in the
attacks—the missiles landed exactly where they were aimed. Instead, the
problem was a failure in the targeting process, which is C4ISR driven.
It is likewise important to recognize that the environment in which an
airstrike takes place can affect the accuracy of a weapon system and the
quality of the associated C4ISR. For instance, nighttime or inclement
1. Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87 INTER446 (2005).
2. An “aimpoint” is “[a] point associated with a target and assigned for a specific
weapon impact. [It] may be defined descriptively (e.g., vent in center of roof), by grid reference, or geolocation. More specific classifications of aimpoint include desired point of
impact, joint desired point of impact, and desired mean point of impact.” Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Nov. 8,
2010), as amended through July 15, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary
[hereinafter DoD Dictionary].
3. “[I]ntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” is “[a]n activity that synchronizes
and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation,
and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an
integrated intelligence and operations function.” Id.
4. For a discussion of these incidents, see Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to International Law, 96 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
247 (2002).
NATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 445,
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weather limits the effectiveness of certain weapon systems. Fire can diminish the usefulness of infrared equipment and smoke may prevent visual target identification, as was demonstrated during coalition airstrikes in the
1990–1991 Gulf War after Kuwaiti oil wells were set ablaze by Iraqi forces.
If a target is heavily defended, an attacker may be forced to launch from a
greater-than-optimal weapons release altitude or range or conduct evasive
maneuvers that make the launch platform unsteady. And, of course, human
error is always possible in the heat of battle.
B. Rise of Precision Airstrikes
Airpower played no significant role in armed conflict until World War I,
when it was initially employed for surveillance and reconnaissance; the first
aerial attacks took the form of close air support for ground forces. Later in
the conflict, belligerents began to use aircraft for strategic strikes, most notably in the zeppelin raids against London.5 By 1918, the U.S. Air Service
and the American Expeditionary Force had drafted a strategic bombing
plan which involved “drop[ping] aerial bombs upon commercial centers
and the lines of communications in such quantities as will wreck the points
aimed at and cut off the necessary supply lines.”6 The war ended before the
plan could be executed.
In the aftermath of World War I, most air forces engaged in comprehensive doctrine reviews. The United States, for example, conducted the
U.S. Bombing Survey, which concluded that the “successful application of
airpower requires a predetermined plan calculated to destroy the enemy’s
will and war sustaining capability. Achieving this goal requires systematic
analysis to determine which targets, if destroyed, would do the greatest
damage to the enemy.”7 In a sense, the Bombing Survey argued for what
would at the end of the century come to be known as “effects-based operations.”8 Conducting operations to achieve particular results, rather than
simply wearing down the enemy’s fielded forces, requires that an attacker
5. For an in-depth history of airpower, see STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, AIR POWER: THE
MEN, MACHINES, AND IDEAS THAT REVOLUTIONIZED WAR, FROM KITTY HAWK TO
GULF WAR II (2004).
6. U.S. Air Force, AF Pamphlet 14-210, Intelligence Targeting Guide, AF Pamphlet
14-210, attachment 2 (Feb. 1, 1998). See this attachment generally for a summary of airpower theory development.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, I1 (Jan. 17, 2002).
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deconstruct enemy systems in order to identify those objectives the destruction of which will achieve specific desired effects. Precision makes this
possible.9
At the time of the U.S. Bombing Survey, the precision technology capable of accomplishing such missions was years from development. During
World War II, for example, a B-17 had a circular error probable10 of roughly 3,300 feet. This meant that at 6,500 feet, approximately 9,000 bombs
from 1,500 aircraft would have to be dropped to achieve a high probability
of destroying a point target.11 Complicating matters was the fact that missions often were flown at night and at high altitude to avoid enemy air defenses, thereby further diminishing the precision of the attacks.
Air operations during the Vietnam conflict marked a sea change in precision warfare. A new generation of laser-guided weapons finally enabled a
single aircraft to destroy a target in one attack. Since the Vietnam conflict,
dramatic technological advances have continued with respect to both precision weapons and C4ISR capabilities. The result has been a sharp rise in
the percentage of airstrikes that employ precision systems. For example,
precision munitions were used in only 8.8 percent of attacks during Operation Desert Storm (1991).12 By the initial phases of Operation Enduring

9. Michael N. Schmitt, Effects-Based Operations and the Law of Aerial Warfare, 5 WASH276 (2006).
10. “[C]ircular error probable” is “[a]n indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon
system, used as a factor in determining probable damage to a target. It is the radius of a
circle within which half of a missile’s projectiles are expected to fall. Also called CEP.”
DoD Dictionary, supra note 2.
11. Colonel Gary L. Crowder, Chief of Strategy, Concepts, and Doctrine, Department
of Defense Air Combat Command, Effects Based Operations Briefing (Mar. 19, 2003),
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2067. As another
example,
INGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW 265,

during Operation Cobra, the breakout from Normandy, U.S. air forces dropped
14,600 500-pound bombs on one German division, destroying 66 tanks and 11 heavy
guns. During Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. dropped 9,800 precision-guided munitions, destroying 2,500 tanks, heavy artillery pieces, and armoured personnel carriers—a ratio of bombs to destruction of equipment 50 times greater than in Operation Cobra.

Robert A. Pape, Hit or Miss: What Precision Air Weapons Do, Precisely, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Sept./Oct. 2004, at 162, 163.
12. WILLIAM M. ARKIN ET AL., GREENPEACE, ON IMPACT: MODERN WARFARE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT, A CASE STUDY OF THE GULF WAR 78 (1991).
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Freedom (2001) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003), those figures were at
65 percent and 68 percent, respectively.13
Technology has progressed to the point where a basic precision strike
capability is within the reach of even less advanced militaries. A prime example is the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which is simply an unguided bomb to which a guidance tail kit has been attached. At $22,000 per
kit, the JDAM is relatively uncomplicated and cheap.14 JDAMs are also fairly accurate, allowing for a precision airstrike with a circular error probable
of less than twenty feet from as far away as fifteen miles.15
Beyond their obvious utility in conventional warfare, precision airstrikes are particularly useful in air campaigns where the objective is not
mere attrition of the enemy’s armed forces. The best example is compellance (or coercive) warfare, in which the objective is to induce an adversary
to engage in, or desist from, particular behavior. NATO adopted this approach during Operation Allied Force, the 1999 air campaign against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The goal of that campaign was to force
President Slobodan Milosevic to resume negotiations and end the mistreatment of the Kosovar-Albanian population by his forces.16 To achieve
these objectives, NATO relied on precision airstrikes to attack specific targets, the destruction of which it believed would convince Milosevic to return to the bargaining table and stop the slaughter. The campaign succeeded in seventy-eight days.17
Counterinsurgency conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, also necessitate precision military operations that go beyond destroying the
enemy’s fielded forces.18 Modern counterinsurgency operations aim to
safeguard the State’s government, infrastructure and civilian population,

13. U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AIR FORCES, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: BY THE
NUMBERS 11 (2003).
14. U.S. Air Force, Factsheet on Joint Direct Attack Munition, GBU-31/32/38,
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=108.
15. Id.
16. See Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Situation In and
Around Kosovo: Statement Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council (Apr. 12, 1999), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-051e.htm.
17. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, KOSOVO/OPERATION ALLIED FORCE AFTERACTION REPORT xvii (2000).
18. See generally HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY & HEADQUARTERS,
MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, COUNTERINSURGENCY (2006).
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while waging war against a discrete group within that State.19 As a result,
counterinsurgency air operations emphasize limiting collateral damage, especially civilian casualties, usually at a level far below law of armed conflict
requirements. Moreover, airstrikes often target particular insurgents within
a group’s command and control structure in order to weaken that group’s
ability to operate cohesively. Since these insurgents often operate among
the civilian population, their targeting is operationally challenging and usually only accomplishable through air operations when advanced precision
capabilities are available.
Looking toward the future, precision airstrikes will play an everincreasing role in warfare. Beyond their military utility in terms of finding,
fixing, and destroying enemy forces, airstrikes also reduce the risk to the
attacker’s forces. New weapon systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles,
air-based cyber-attack platforms and autonomous systems will further
those goals. Of course, as precision attack takes center stage in twenty-firstcentury warfare, so too will issues as to the law of armed conflict that governs such operations.
III. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT GOVERNING PRECISION AIRSTRIKES
The development of precision airstrike capabilities occurred as the law of
armed conflict governing the conduct of hostilities, especially the protection of civilians and civilian objects, began to achieve maturity. Of particular note is the 1977 Protocol Additional I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
which represented the first codification of such key principles and rules as
distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack.20 Although the Protocol does not encompass all aspects of air warfare, it expressly applies to
“attacks from . . . the air against objectives on land.”21 Among States possessing robust precision attack capabilities, the United States and Israel
stand out as non-parties to the treaty. However, both States recognize the

19. Id. at 5-1 (“Successful counterinsurgents support or develop local institutions with
legitimacy and the ability to provide basic services, economic opportunity, public order,
and security. The political issues at stake are often rooted in culture, ideology, societal tensions, and injustice. As such, they defy nonviolent solutions.”).
20. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 48, 51 and 57, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
21. Id., art. 49(3).
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core targeting principles and rules set forth therein as generally reflective of
customary international law.22
In 2010, a major multiyear research effort sponsored by Harvard University’s Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research and led by
Professor Yoram Dinstein produced the Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (AMW Manual).23 The work, authored by a
group of distinguished international law experts and practitioners, represents an unofficial, yet authoritative, restatement of the principles and rules
governing aerial operations. In its examination of the key legal issues surrounding precision aerial warfare, this article relies heavily on both the
AMW Manual and Additional Protocol I as key repositories of the applicable law.
A. Prohibited Weapon Systems
Certain weapon systems and individual weapons are prohibited in aerial
warfare irrespective of how they are used or the results their use generates.
First, only military aircraft may be used to conduct airstrikes; airstrikes by
civilian aircraft are unlawful regardless of how precise they might be.24 Second, the law of armed conflict forbids the employment of particular weapons on military aircraft even when they are capable of striking a lawful target with great precision and without risk to civilians and civilian objects.
These include the following:
(a) Biological, including bacteriological, weapons[;]
(b) Chemical weapons[;]
(c) Laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function
or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness
to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with
corrective eyesight devices[;]
22. See, e.g., U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps & U.S. Marine Corps, NWP 114M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, The Commander's Handbook on the Law
of Naval Operations ch. 8 (2007) (reiterating most of the Additional Protocol I targeting
rules).
23. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2009) [hereinafter
AMW MANUAL]. Professor Schmitt served as one of the members of the drafting team
for the manual.
24. Id., rule 17(a) (“Only military aircraft, including UCAVs, are entitled to engage in
attacks.”).
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(d) Poison, poisoned substances and poisoned weapons[;]
(e) Small arms projectiles calculated, or of a nature, to cause explosion
on impact with or within the human body[; and]
(f) Weapons the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments
which in the human body escape detection by x-ray.25

B. The Principle of Distinction
The principle of distinction was set forth as early as the 1868 St. Petersburg
Declaration,26 adopted in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations,27 and codified in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I. The International Court of Justice has described it as one of the two “cardinal” principles of the law of
armed conflict.28 The International Committee of the Red Cross has labeled it the “foundation on which the codification of the laws and customs
of war rests.”29
By the principle, parties to a conflict must distinguish between combatants and military objectives on the one hand and civilians and civilian objects on the other.30 Once this distinction has been made, they may only
attack those targets that qualify as military objectives, combatants, or civilians directly participating in hostilities.31 In case of doubt as to the targetability of an individual under the law of armed conflict, an individual must
be treated as a civilian immune from attack.32 Precision lies at the heart of
25. Id., rule 6(a)–(f).
26. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under
400 Grammes Weight pmbl. ¶ 2, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297 (“That the only legitimate objects which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the
military forces of the enemy.”).
27. Convention [II] with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with annex of regulations arts. 22, 29, 32, July 29, 1899, Stat. 1803, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247;
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention
No. 4 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, 1 Bevans 631.
28. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, ¶ 78 (July 8).
29. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶ 1863 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski &
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY].
30. Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 48.
31. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 10. See also Additional Protocol I, supra note
20, arts. 51(2), 51(3) and 52(1).
32. Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 50(1); see also AMW MANUAL, supra note
23, rule 12; PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, COMMEN-
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the principle of distinction because, as noted, precision involves more than
simply striking a particular point (accuracy); it involves hitting the right target in the right way. Therefore, target identification is of paramount importance for both precision warfare and the principle of distinction.
Military objectives, the first category subject to lawful attack, are those
“objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”33 This definition has two express criteria. First, the
object must make an “effective contribution” to enemy operations. While
this criterion by no means requires that the contribution be “significant,”
the object “must in fact contribute to the enemy’s military action.”34 Second, the military advantage gained by targeting the object must be “definite.” This requires that the advantage not be “merely potential, speculative
or indeterminate.”35 ISR is often a necessary component in determining
whether these two criteria have been satisfied. If they are not satisfied, then
the operation in question is neither a precision strike nor a lawful attack.
Despite universal acceptance of the textual definition of “military objective” set out above, controversy persists over its parameters. Clearly,
“war-fighting” targets qualify, as do those that are “war-supporting,” such
as factories producing munitions or military equipment. However, the
United States has taken the position that the term also encompasses “economic targets of the enemy that indirectly but effectively support and sustain the enemy’s war-fighting capability.”36 This definition is not widely accepted, as some expert commentators claim it “goes too far” because it
does not require the objective to have a “proximate nexus to military action.”37
TARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE rule 12(a) cmts. 3 and 4 (2010) [hereinafter AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY].
33. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 1(y). This definition is based on Additional

Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 52(2).
34. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 1(y) cmt. 4.
35. Id., rule 1(y) cmt. 7. See also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2024.
36. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS 402–3 (A. R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, U.S.
Naval War College International Law Studies) (describing this as a “statement of customary international law”).
37. Yoram Dinstein, Legitimate Military Objectives Under the Current Jus In Bello, LEGAL
AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO’S KOSOVO CAMPAIGN 139, 145–46 (Andru E. Wall ed.,
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There are four different ways in which an object may fulfill the two express criteria (i.e., “effective contribution” and “definite military advantage”)—through its “nature, location, purpose or use.” “Nature” denotes “an inherent characteristic or attribute which contributes to military
action.”38 This would include all military equipment and facilities. “Location” relates to “selected areas that have special importance to military operations,”39 regardless of how those areas are currently being used. A commonly cited example is a mountain pass that, if blocked, would halt an enemy’s advance.
“Use” refers to the present function of an object. Those objects that do
not qualify as military objectives by “nature” become military objectives by
“use” when employed for military purposes, but only for so long as they
are so employed. For example, a civilian vehicle may be attacked if enemy
forces commandeer it to transport troops, but not once it is returned to its
civilian owner.40 Lastly, “purpose” focuses on the future use of an object.
It recognizes that “an attacker need not wait until an object is actually used
for military ends before being allowed to attack it as a military objective.”41
Since “purpose” depends on the attacker’s perception of the enemy’s intent, and since the enemy’s intent is not always clear, the attacker must act
reasonably.42 The ability to observe a potential target to determine whether
it qualifies as a military objective on one of these four bases is a critical el-

2002) (Vol. 78, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). On the other hand,
some commentators have argued that the term “military objective” should be interpreted
even more broadly. See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap Jr., The End of Innocence: Rethinking Noncombatancy in the Post-Kosovo Era, STRATEGIC REVIEW, Summer 2000, at 9, 14); Jeanne M.
Meyer, Tearing Down the Façade: A Critical Look at the Current Law on Targeting the Will of the
Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 143 (2001).
38. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 22(a) cmt. 1; see also ICRC
COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2020.
39. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 22(b) cmt; see also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2021.
40. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 22(d) cmt. 1; see also ICRC
COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2022.
41. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 22(c) cmt. 1; ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2022.
42. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 22(c) cmt. 3 (“The attacker
must always act reasonably, i.e. as would be proper under a similar set of circumstances
for any other Belligerent Party. In other words, the attacker must ask itself whether it
would be reasonable to conclude that the intelligence was reliable enough to conduct the
attack in light of the circumstances ruling at the time.”).
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ement of target identification that is often made possible by advanced precision capabilities, most notably ISR.
Like military objectives, combatants are lawful targets and, as with the
former, precision capabilities are often a key to their proper identification.
Combatants are “[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict
as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such
armed forces,”43 excluding “medical or religious personnel.”44 Members of
other militias or volunteer corps are also combatants when they fulfill the
following cumulative conditions:
(a) Are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) Have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) Carry their arms openly; and
(d) Conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war.45
Note that the term “combatant” is used to describe only participants in
an international armed conflict (i.e., a conflict between States). However,
“like members of the regular armed forces of the State concerned, members of a non-State organized armed group in a non-international armed
conflict are lawful targets.”46
Civilians directly participating in hostilities may also be targeted.47 This
norm was the subject of a five-year International Committee of the Red
Cross project that led to the 2009 publication of the Interpretive Guidance on
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian
Law.48 Of particular importance is the Guidance’s delineation of the consti43. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; see also AMW MANUAL
COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 10(b)(i) cmt. 1.
44. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 10(b)(i) cmt. 2.
45. Geneva Convention III, supra note 43, art. 4(A)(2). See also AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 10(b)(i) cmt. 2.
46. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 10(b); see also NILS MELZER,
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE
NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 36 (2009) [hereinafter ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE].
47. Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 51(3); see also Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 13(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; AMW
MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 28.
48. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 46.
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tutive elements of direct participation. By that standard, an act qualifying an
individual as a direct participant “must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack.”49 There must also be a causal connection between the act and the harm and the act must exhibit belligerent nexus.50
Controversy remains over both the precise criteria for determining that a
civilian is directly participating in hostilities51 and as to when the direct participant may be lawfully attacked.52 Despite these debates, the premise that
civilians directly participating in hostilities may be targeted is widely accepted, and precision technology is invaluable in determining whether a civilian
is participating as such.
C. Prohibition against Indiscriminate Attack
The law of armed conflict prohibits indiscriminate attacks, which are
“those that cannot be or are not directed against lawful targets . . . or the
effects of which cannot be limited as required by the law of international
armed conflict, and which therefore are of a nature to strike lawful targets
and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”53 In other words, the
49. Id. at 47.
50. Id. at 46–64.
51. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 29 cmt. 5.
52. Id., rule 28 cmt. 3. For a more robust examination of the various points of contention, see, e.g., Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 641 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing
Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 697 (2010); Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time
As”: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 741 (2010); W. Hays Parks, Part IX of
the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 769
(2010); Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities,
42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (2010).
53. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 13 (b); See also Additional Protocol I, supra
note 20, art. 54. For the prohibition on indiscriminate attack as part of customary international law, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶ 463 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007) (holding that firing high-dispersion
non-guided rockets at a densely populated civilian area constituted an indiscriminate attack).
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notion of indiscriminate attack encompasses both the use of weapons incapable of discriminating between lawful and unlawful targets and the use
of weapons that, albeit capable of being directed at a lawful target, are used
indiscriminately. Indiscriminate attacks are the antithesis of precision warfare.
A violation of the prohibition against indiscriminate use of a lawful
weapon typically involves reckless disregard for the safety of civilian persons or objects.54 At its most basic level, an indiscriminate attack is one
where the weapon system could be aimed, but the attacker fails to do so, as
in the case of blindly dropping bombs over enemy territory. Other examples include an attack based on patently unreliable information and one in
which the weapon is employed in an environment that causes it to be highly inaccurate (e.g., at a very high altitude or in weather that disrupts guidance system functionality). As these examples demonstrate, every aspect of
a precision airstrike (accuracy, C4ISR and outside factors) can prove determinative as to whether a strike is indiscriminate as a matter of law.
The prohibition also extends to certain types of “target area” bombing
since “[a]ttacks must not treat as a single lawful target a number of clearly
separated and distinct lawful targets located in a city, town, village or area
containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects.”55 Compliance with this norm is directly related to the precision capabilities of the
weapon systems involved. If those capabilities afford an attacker the option of individually attacking lawful targets in the area, it must do so. On
the other hand, if the systems used are insufficiently precise to mount separate attacks, the area itself may be attacked (so long as the attack comports
with the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions in
attack).
Use of indiscriminate weapons is likewise prohibited.56 As noted above,
certain weapons are prohibited per se from use, often because of their indiscriminate character.57 All other weapons are analyzed on a case-by-case
basis.58 They may be proscribed as indiscriminate on two grounds.
54. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 126–28 (2010).
55. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 13(c); see also Additional Protocol I, supra note
20, art. 51(5).
56. The International Court of Justice has labeled the prohibition on indiscriminate
weapons “cardinal.” Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, ¶ 105E.
57. See AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 6.
58. See id., rule 13(a) cmt. 2.
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First, weapons cannot be used if they are incapable of being reliably
aimed at a military objective. The paradigmatic example is the German V-2
rocket employed during World War II. Its guidance system was such that
any attempt to use it to attack a particular military objective within its
range, including large objectives such as military installations, would likely
fail; a successful attack would effectively be the product of luck. The precision capabilities of most contemporary weapon systems would preclude
them from running afoul of this prohibition. For instance, even in the case
of unguided (gravity or “dumb”) bombs, delivery methodologies have been
developed which provide the weapon system (aircraft and bomb) a degree
of accuracy.
Second, the use of weapons that have uncontrollable effects is unlawful. The most commonly cited examples are biological contagions or persistent airborne chemicals that, even if accurately aimed at enemy forces,
could easily spread to the civilian population. Both are by nature indiscriminate, a fact that explains their long-standing prohibition.59
International law’s application and understanding of the rules prohibiting indiscriminate attacks will evolve with advances in precision weaponry.
For example, while bombs dropped from a B-17 during World War II had
a circular error probable exceeding three thousand feet, today such accuracy (or lack thereof) would be considered indiscriminate. In the future, it is
plausible that unguided air-delivered weapons as such may begin to be
characterized as violating the prohibition.
D. Proportionality
The rule of proportionality prohibits an “attack that may be expected to
cause collateral damage which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”60 It applies when an attack
is properly directed at a lawful target but “collateral damage” is neverthe59. See AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 6; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,
Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
60. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 14; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 20,
arts. 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(b). For proportionality as part of customary law of armed conflict,
see Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, ¶ 105E (Higgins, J., dissenting).
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less unavoidable. Collateral damage consists of “incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects or other protected objects or a combination thereof, caused by an attack on a lawful target.”61
Recognized injuries do not include mere inconvenience or fear among the
civilian population.62 While there is some dispute regarding the extent to
which “indirect effects” of an airstrike must be taken into account when
assessing proportionality, general agreement exists that consequences
should not be included in the proportionality analysis if they are “too remote or cannot be reasonably foreseen.”63
Military advantage, the factor in the context of which collateral damage
is considered, consists of “those benefits of a military nature that result
from attack.”64 Although certain commentators argue that the term includes only “ground gained” and “annihilating or weakening the enemy
armed forces,”65 the AMW Manual suggests the “better approach” is to include “any consequence of an attack which directly enhances friendly military operations or hinders those of the enemy.”66 Consider a precision airstrike that does not destroy an enemy armored column, but instead reduces
its mobility by, for example, destroying a bridge across which it would pass.
The AMW Manual would properly characterize the diminished mobility of
the column as a military advantage.
Key to correct application of the proportionality analysis is an emphasis
on what is “expected” and “anticipated.” When performing a proportionality analysis, an attacker has to anticipate the likely consequences of a strike;
the focus is on expectations, not results. These expectations must be “reasonable” in the sense that a “good faith assessment by the commander
planning or approving the attack” would conclude that the outcome is
“probable, i.e. more likely than not.”67 The reasonableness requirement attaches at every stage of an attack. Accordingly, an individual with the authority or ability to suspend an attack must do so if, at any point, he or she
concludes that an operation would cause excessive collateral damage in re61. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 1 (l); see also Additional Protocol I, supra note
20, art. 51(5).
62. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 1(l) cmt 5.
63. Id., rule 14 cmt. 4.
64. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 1(w).
65. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2218.
66. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 1(w) cmt. 3.
67. Id., rule 14 cmt. 6. Similarly, proportionality requires that the military advantage be
“concrete and direct,” meaning it must be “clearly identifiable” instead of “based merely
on hope or speculation.” Id., rule 14 cmt. 9.
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lation to the anticipated military advantage.68 Both the commander who
approves a mission and the aircrew that flies it would, for example, be included.
Precision is highly determinative of both the collateral damage and the
military advantage that are likely to result from a strike. Attackers must
consider such factors as the timeliness, reliability and comprehensiveness
of target intelligence, the accuracy of the weapon system, and the effect of
environmental factors when forming their expectations or anticipations.
Once the collateral damage and military advantage are estimated, the attacker has to determine whether the former is “excessive” relative to the
latter. While the AMW Manual defines “excessive” as a “significant imbalance,”69 it must be remembered that proportionality does not involve a
strict mathematic balancing test. Such a test would be conceptually and
practically impossible in that it would require commanders and others performing a proportionality analysis to value and compare dissimilar entities.
For example, how is an attacker supposed to estimate how much a tank is
“worth” in terms of civilian deaths or civilian property damage? The excessiveness standard avoids the legal fiction that the value of these dissimilar
entities can be quantified along a single axis. Instead, it bans attacks in
which proportionality between the ends sought and the expected harm to
civilians and civilian objects is absent altogether. Restated, the test is simply
one of reasonableness in the prevailing circumstances.
Since excessiveness is determined only in relation to the military advantage an attacker reasonably anticipates gaining, as the potential military
advantage estimate grows so does the acceptable extent of likely collateral
damage. While some have asserted that any attack resulting in “extensive”
collateral damage is forbidden,70 this is wrong as a matter of law; there is no
absolute threshold of collateral damage above which the rule of proportionality ceases to apply and an attack is prohibited.71 Instead, proportionality assessments must be made for every attack and they are always contextual.72 Depending on the military advantage anticipated to result, some
68. Id., rule 14 cmt. 15; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 57(2)(b).
69. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 14 cmt. 7.
70. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 1980.
71. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 14 cmt. 8.
72. See, e.g., Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, ¶ 105E (holding that
the Court could not “conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very
survival of a State would be at stake”).
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highly precise strikes may cause collateral damage that qualifies as excessive, while attacks employing no precision systems may sometimes result in
collateral damage that is not excessive in light of the military gain sought.
Improvements in precision airstrike capabilities will unquestionably exercise a direct influence on how proportionality will be understood in future combat operations. As noted in the context of indiscriminate attacks,
standards generally become more restrictive with advances in precision
technology. Therefore, as the capacity to conduct precision airstrikes
grows, attitudes toward the acceptability of collateral damage under the law
of armed conflict (i.e., what is considered “excessive”) will likely become
more demanding.
E. Precautions in Attack
The law of armed conflict requires that “[c]onstant care must be taken to
spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”73 “Constant
care” entails taking certain “feasible precautions” both before and during a
strike.74 The precautions are designed to ensure, to the extent possible, that
only lawful targets are attacked and collateral damage is minimized. The
availability of precision capabilities affects compliance with most of the
obligatory precautionary measures.
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I generally codifies the specific precautions, each of which is reflected in the AMW Manual. These precautions
need only be taken when doing so is “feasible.” “Feasible” denotes a
measure of precaution that “is practicable or practically possible, taking
into account all circumstances prevailing at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.”75 What is considered practicable or practically possible has been described as “a matter of common sense and good
faith.”76
At its core, feasibility is a reasonableness standard—those who plan,
approve or execute an attack have to undertake any measures to limit harm
73. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 30. See also Additional Protocol I, supra note
20, art. 57(1).
74. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 57; AMW MANUAL, supra note 23,
rules 30–33.
75. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 1(q); see also Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices art. 3(10), May
3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93.
76. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2198.
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to civilians and civilian objects that a reasonable warfighter in the same or
similar circumstances would take. Of course, attackers are only required to
take into account information that is “reasonably available”77 to them “at
the relevant time and place.”78 Furthermore, in deciding whether a measure
is feasible, they may factor in military considerations, such as the availability
of precision weapons, competing demands for surveillance capabilities and
risk to friendly forces.
As to specific measures, attackers must first do everything feasible to
verify that the target is a lawful one and does not benefit from specific protection.79 Determining which objectives qualify as lawful targets requires an
attacker to utilize reasonably available ISR assets to gain information about
the target. In particular, the “quality and timeliness of the intelligence has
to be considered,” including the potential that the “enemy may attempt to
provide disinformation.”80 An attacker should also assess the availability of
other sources of intelligence, such as “on the spot” visual observations.81
The requisite level of certainty as to target identification is not entirely
clear. Some commentators appear to require near certainty.82 However,
such a standard would ignore the realities of combat, in which attackers
operate in the fog of war. A more manageable standard that comports with
the notion of feasibility asks whether a reasonable warfighter, having exhausted all reasonably available means of verification in light of the prevailing circumstances, would launch the attack. This standard allows attackers
to balance the potential military advantage against both the likely collateral
damage and any degree of doubt as to the objective’s status as a lawful target, just as the law of armed conflict allows military advantage to offset collateral damage more generally. Obviously, precision capabilities play a key
role in this process, especially ISR assets that allow targets to be located,
monitored and identified. While these capabilities have immense military
utility, they can also be constraining. If a “reasonable warfighter in the
same or similar circumstances” would consider their use both helpful in
77. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 32(a).
78. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 1(q) cmt. 3.
79. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 32(a); see also Additional Protocol I, supra note
20, art. 57(2)(a)(i).
80. See AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 32(a). cmt. 2.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 2195 (“[I]n case of doubt, even if
there is only slight doubt, [those who plan or decide upon attack] must call for additional
information.”).
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identifying an objective and feasible, an attack not employing such capabilities would be unlawful.
Similarly, the requirement to take precautions in attack also mandates
that an attacker choose from among feasible means (weapons) and methods (tactics) of warfare in order to minimize collateral damage.83 As with
target identification, precision capabilities can act as a double-edged sword
when complying with this required precaution. While helpful both militarily
and in conforming to the law of armed conflict, precision capabilities can
also force an attacker’s hand when their use is mandatory under this rule.
After all, since precision capabilities usually allow for greater accuracy and
lesser explosive force, their use (when available) may be required as a matter of law when the result would be less harm to civilians and civilian property.
This rule has two important caveats. First, States are not required to
acquire or field precision capabilities.84 The battlefield is “come as you are”
in the law of armed conflict. Second, even when an attacker has precision
capabilities available and their use would limit civilian harm, employment is
compulsory only when feasible.85 For example, precision capabilities may
be in short supply at the time of attack. In such a situation, a commander
may preserve some or all of his or her precision weapons for later operations, taking into account both military and humanitarian concerns. The
paradigmatic example is retention for use in impending urban operations,
where precision weapons will prove highly useful in avoiding collateral
damage.
A third key precaution in attack applies when an attacker has a choice
between several military objectives the destruction of which would result in
83. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 32 (b); see also Additional Protocol I, supra note
20, art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
84. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 8. See also DINSTEIN, supra note 54, at 142
(“No [law of international armed conflict] LOIAC obligation is incumbent on Belligerent
Parties to use expensive ‘smart bombs’ where cheaper ‘dumb bombs’ will do.”).
85. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rules 31–32. However, some claim there is a duty
to use precision munitions whenever available or at least in certain environments (e.g.,
urban areas). See, e.g., Stuart W. Belt., Missiles over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary
Norm Requiring Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL LAW REVIEW 115, 174
(2000); Danielle L. Infeld, Precision-Guided Munitions Demonstrated Their Pinpoint Accuracy in
Desert Storm; But Is a Country Obligated to Use Precision Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian
Injury and Damage?, 26 GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS 109, 110–11 (1992). Both assertions are wrong as the decision is
always fully contextual.
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a similar military advantage. In that situation, an attacker must select the
objective which, when attacked, would involve the least danger to civilian
lives and civilian objects or to other protected persons and objects. 86 Here
again, precision capabilities may have a restrictive effect on an attacker to
the extent that they increase the number of potential targets that can be
feasibly attacked. As with the other precautions though, the only objectives
that need be considered are those on which an attack is militarily reasonable. For example, imagine there are two potential targets the destruction of
which would yield the same military advantage. One is heavily defended,
but remote from civilians, while the other has few defenses, but is located
in the vicinity of civilians and civilian structures. In this situation, the targeting of the heavily defended objective would not be required, even
though its destruction would offer a “similar military advantage” and cause
less collateral damage.87
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: A NEW GENERATION OF
PRECISION WEAPON SYSTEMS
Three relatively new weapon systems—unmanned combat aerial vehicles
(UCAV), autonomous weapon systems, and cyber-attack systems—have
captured the attention of the law of armed conflict community. Each raises
issues of precision that merit careful reflection.
A. Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles
An unmanned combat aerial vehicle, commonly referred to as a “drone,” is
an “unmanned military aircraft of any size which carries and launches a
weapon, or which can use on-board technology to direct such a weapon to
a target.”88 The use of UCAVs has dramatically grown over the past dec-

86. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 33; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 20,
art. 57(3).
87. However, the risk to military personnel must still be balanced against the risk of
collateral damage. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 1(q) cmt. 5
(“[W]hereas a particular course of action may be considered non-feasible due to military
considerations (such as excessive risks to aircraft and their crews), some risks have to be
accepted in light of humanitarian considerations.”).
88. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 1(ee). Within the U.S. Air Force unmanned
aerial vehicles are commonly referred to as “remotely piloted aircraft” (RPA). U.S. Air
Force, AFDD 1-02, Air Force Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of
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ade, a trend which is certain to continue.89 This is understandable in light of
their ability to employ precision weapons using enhanced ISR capabilities
in an operation that poses no risk to the aircrew conducting the mission.
While the law of armed conflict principles and rules discussed in Part
III apply with equal force to UCAV operations,90 the unique precision capabilities UCAVs offer commanders influence their application, especially
with regard to the requirement to take precautions in attack. The fact that a
UCAV sortie poses no risk to the aircrew enhances the feasibility of their
use in high-threat environments, thereby increasing the precision of the
strike itself and making possible attacks on alternative targets that might
not otherwise be viable. Onboard ISR capabilities, such as sensors and
cameras, and the ability of UCAVs to loiter over a target for extended periods, bolster their ability to identify a target. UCAV ISR capabilities also
minimize the likelihood, or degree, of collateral damage by making possible
execution of the attack when civilians and civilian objects are least likely to
be harmed. Additionally, UCAVs are armed only with precision weaponry,
thereby providing commanders an effective option when selecting methods
and means of warfare with the goal of minimizing civilian harm in mind.
B. Automated Weapon Systems
Developments in automated weapons technology have led some States to
“envision a world in which humans need not be in the decision loop.” 91
Military and Associated Terms (Jan. 11, 2007, incorporating Change 1, Jan 6. 2012), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd1-2.pdf.
89. For example, the Department of Defense is dramatically increasing reliance on
UCAVs and other drones. Adam Entous et al., More Drones, Fewer Troops, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Jan. 27, 2012, at 10.
90. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems (Armed Drones) and
International Humanitarian Law: Simplifying the Oft Benighted Debate, 30 BOSTON UNIVERSITY
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 595, 609 (2012); Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings ¶ 79, Human
Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24
.Add6.pdf (“[A] missile fired from a drone is no different from any other commonly used
weapon, including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or gunship that fires missiles.
The critical legal question is the same for each weapon: whether its specific use complies
with [international humanitarian law].”).
91. U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND, UNMANNED EFFECTS (UFX): TAKING THE HUMAN OUT OF THE LOOP 4 (2003). See also U.S. AIR FORCE, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT PLAN 2009-2047, at 41 (2009).
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Such “fully autonomous weapon systems” would be capable of identifying
potential targets, selecting them for attack and striking them without human interface.92 Armed forces around the world are extremely interested in
these systems since the operation of manned weapon systems can be personnel intensive and dangerous, while systems that are operated remotely,
such as UCAVs, are vulnerable to communications jamming or cyber attack.
Fully autonomous weapon systems must be distinguished from other
systems. For example, “human-supervised” autonomous systems—such as
Israel’s Iron Dome—have been in operation for years.93 These systems
have a “human in the loop” that closely monitors an engagement and can
override the system if needed. Certain other weapon systems such as the
“close-in weapon system”94 can be programmed to operate autonomously,
but are presently used solely for point defense in accordance with very narrow fixed parameters.
The fact that autonomous weapon systems have become both militarily
desirable and technologically feasible is spawning interest in the legal issues
surrounding their use.95 Indeed, Human Rights Watch has asserted the
weapon systems would be “unable to meet legal standards” and therefore

92. An autonomous weapons system is defined as:
a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further
intervention by a human operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous
weapon systems that are designed to allow human operators to override operation of
the weapon system, but can select and engage targets without further human input
after activation.

Deputy Secretary of Defense, DoDD 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems 13–14
(Nov. 21, 2012).
93. Iron Dome can operate automatically using programmed parameters, but the system also allows for human operator intervention. Inbal Orpaz, How Does Iron Dome Operate?, HAARETZ (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.haaretz.com/news/features/how-does-theiron-dome-work.premium-1.478988.
94. See generally U.S. Navy, MK 15—Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS),
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=487&ct=2.
95. See generally Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 231 (2013); Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers,
176 POLICY REVIEW (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review
/article/135336; Markus Wagner, Taking Humans Out of the Loop: Implications for International
Humanitarian Law, 21 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION AND SCIENCE 155 (2011).
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“should be banned.”96 Pronouncements of illegality are premature at best
and more likely simply wrong. As with most weapon systems, the principal
normative issues involve use of the systems, not their possible status as unlawful weapons per se. Unsurprisingly, most of the challenging legal questions bear on the degree of precision the systems might be able to achieve.
For example, Human Rights Watch contends that autonomous weapons violate the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks because “[f]ully autonomous weapon systems would not have the ability to sense or interpret
the difference between soldiers and civilians, especially in contemporary
combat environments.”97 There are two problems with this statement.
First, it ignores the fact that some battlespaces contain no civilian persons
or objects. In such environments, fully autonomous systems that are unable
to identify civilian persons or objects could still be used without violating
the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks because there is no chance of
harming civilian persons or objects. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the statement assumes that no technological developments will afford
fully autonomous systems an ability to distinguish between military and
civilian personnel and objects.98 This is a curious stance since the ability of
weapon systems to discriminate on the battlefield has been growing exponentially due to technological advances, often in ways that seemed unimaginable only a few years earlier.
The ability of autonomous weapon systems to comply with the principle of proportionality has likewise been questioned.99 If there is no “human
in the loop,” the weapon system would have to both estimate the likely collateral damage and determine whether that damage is excessive relative to
96. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER RO1–2 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/11/19/losing-humanity-

BOTS

0.

97. Id. at 30.
98. The current state of technology already allows computers to recognize many
things:
Modern sensors can, inter alia, assess the shape and size of objects, determine their
speed, identify the type of propulsion being used, determine the material of which
they are made, listen to the object and its environs, and intercept associated communications or other electronic emissions. They can also collect additional data on other
objects or individuals in the area and, depending on the platform with which they are
affiliated, monitor a potential target for extended periods in order to gather information that will enhance the reliability of identification and facilitate target engagement when the risk of collateral damage is low.

Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 95, at 297.
99. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 96, at 32.
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the military advantage anticipated to result from the attack. While critics
rightly suggest that current technology is incapable of performing this task,
future autonomous weapon systems will likely be programmable to perform analysis similar to the collateral damage estimate methodology
(CDEM)100 currently used to determine the likelihood of harm to civilians
or civilian objects in a target area. After all, CDEM relies on objective data
and scientific algorithms. The resulting collateral damage estimate could
then be used as the basis for “proportionality red lines” which, given the
type of target being engaged, would preclude attack based on preprogrammed criteria.
The potential use of these weapons raises difficult legal questions.
However, until the degree of precision they can achieve becomes clearer,
any ban on their use would be rash. Indeed, it is conceivable that future
fully autonomous systems might be more precise and better able to distinguish lawful targets from civilians and civilian objects than their manned or
remotely operated counterparts.
C. Cyber Attacks
Cyber attacks launched from or through airborne platforms are by their
very nature accurate. As with more traditional precision airstrikes, cyber
attacks will almost always involve extensive C4ISR capabilities. Not only
are advanced computer and communications capabilities required to mount
these attacks, but increased cyber security has made cyber intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance essential because the potential vulnerabilities
of any target system must be identified and understood before effective
exploitation is possible. Furthermore, attacking those vulnerabilities may
require computer code specifically designed to exploit a particular vulnerability.
The law of armed conflict principles and rules discussed in Part III apply only to those cyber operations that qualify as an “attack.”101 As a term
of art in the law of armed conflict, an attack is defined as “an act of vio-

100. For a discussion of the methodology, see Defense Intelligence Agency General
Counsel, Briefing: Joint Targeting Cycle and Collateral Damage Estimate Methodology
(CDM), Nov. 10, 2009, http://www.aclu.org/files/dronefoia/dod/drone_dod_ACLU
_DRONES_JOINT_STAFF_SLIDES_1-47.pdf.
101. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, ch. 4, § 2, cmts. 1–3 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
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lence, whether in offence or in defence.”102 This includes non-kinetic operations, such as computer operations that “result in death, injury, damage or
destruction of persons or objects.”103
In the absence of State practice, all predictions as to how the law of
armed conflict will eventually shape the use of cyber attacks remain highly
speculative. That said, it is probable that the extant law will, as it has with
other new weapon systems, generally suffice to govern cyber-weapon systems, albeit with some interpretive accommodation for the unique characteristics of cyberspace. In particular, the interconnectivity of military and
civilian cyber systems may result in a greater demand for precision than is
the case with kinetic weaponry. For instance, the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks could in the future be interpreted to restrict the use of certain
malware against military objectives that rely on dual-use (civilian/military)
networks. Similarly, the precautions in attack rules may be interpreted to
require a certain degree of target network mapping due to the risk of bleedover into civilian systems.
Due to the immense non-physical damage that cyber operations are capable of causing, it is also possible that, over time, the law of armed conflict will evolve in response. For example, it is conceivable that the current
understanding of what constitutes an attack may expand to include certain
cyber operations that do not cause physical injury or damage, thereby prohibiting the directing of such operations at protected persons and objects.
This sort of shift in understanding may similarly end up expanding what
qualifies as collateral damage. Beyond any evolution in the application of
current law of armed conflict principles, new prohibitions may also be
adopted that provide special protection for certain civilian objects, such as
critical infrastructure. Any of these potential changes—lowering the
threshold for what constitutes an attack, expanding the definition of collateral damage or adopting a new group of protected objects—would require
heightened precision capabilities.

102. AMW MANUAL, supra note 23, rule 1(e). Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, art.
49.
103. AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 32, rule 1(e) cmt. 7. See also TALLINN
MANUAL, supra note 101, rule 30 (“[A] cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive
or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or
destruction to objects.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
Precision lies at the heart of both contemporary air warfare and the law of
armed conflict rules that govern it. Precision capabilities increase an attacker’s ability to distinguish between military and civilian objectives, thereby
fostering compliance with the principle of distinction. Furthermore, the
accuracy and C4ISR capabilities that are integral to precision weaponry
mean that such weapons cannot be deemed indiscriminate. On the contrary, the increased ability to gather information about a target, distinguish
lawful from unlawful targets and strike lawful targets with great accuracy
help to ensure that attacks are neither indiscriminate nor violative of the
principle of proportionality. Additionally, precision capabilities expand the
means, methods and target options that are available to an attacker. This
increases an attacker’s feasible options in planning and executing airstrikes,
thereby increasing the influence of the precautions in attack rules on air
operations.
This does not mean that precision capabilities are a panacea. Of course,
precision capabilities may be used in an unlawful manner. Perhaps most
nefariously, precision can facilitate surgical strikes against protected persons or places such as religious or political leaders, gatherings of particular
ethnic groups or cultural property. But in general, precision capabilities
contribute positively to humanitarian ends.
While precision capabilities make possible attacks that the law of armed
conflict would otherwise prohibit by limiting the risk of harm to civilians
and civilian objects, such capabilities also act as a restraint on air operations
in some situations. In particular, the requirements of precautions in attack
may either mandate the use of precision capabilities before an attack is
launched or prohibit an attack on an otherwise lawful target when another
option is available that poses less risk to civilians or civilian objects. This is
so even when the enemy may not be restricted in this manner, because it
lacks precision systems. In other words, the law is relative; one side’s precision capabilities may prohibit it from conducting operations open to its
enemy.
In the future, demands for precision will unquestionably intensify. The
expectations of the global community as to precision capabilities have
grown steadily since the Vietnam conflict and show no sign of abating. On
the contrary, the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan
heightened expectations because they were so restrictive in terms of collateral damage. The fact that operational and policy concerns, not legal con-
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straints, drove the restrictions has gone unnoticed by many. Additionally,
the advent of unmanned and cyber systems, both of which offer precision
capabilities not otherwise available on the battlefield, will further amplify
expectations as the international law community begins to grasp their potential to avoid civilian harm. Once this occurs, the interpretation and application of law of armed conflict norms regarding targeting will inexorably
evolve, as they always have, with advances in precision technology.
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